Update to THY crash 25 Feb 2009

Turkish Airlines flight 1951crash at Amsterdam:

Turkish Airlines flight 1951 crash at Amsterdam: This flight, a Boeing 737-800, enroute Istanbul-Amsterdam on 25 February 2009, faltered and crashed short of the runway attempting a landing at Schipol International airport, Amsterdam.

Due to great skill of the pilots in managing to keep the wings level, even though there was little or no power, the plane pancaked into a muddy field, right side up.

It cracked into three pieces, and there were five deaths, including both pilots, and very serious injuries in the front of the plane, but miraculously no fire.

Dutch authorities investigating the accident were able to deduce from analysis of the flight data recorder a pretty accurate reconstruction of what happened. As the flight approached Schipol, descending gradually in an approach pattern, when it reached altitude 1950 feet, the captain's or left radio altimeter suddenly, and for reasons still unknown, started to show a reading of minus 8 feet, instead of the real altitude.

The second radio altimeter, on the First Officer, or co-pilot's side, was registering the correct altitude. But, because Boeing had designed the altimeter-autopilot system so as to feed altitude information into the autopilot only from the left altimeter, several things, all bad - happened quickly.

The plane was on autopilot, a device that reduces crew workload and was still a permissible setting at this stage in the approach. The minus 8 altitude data was fed into the autopilot automatically from the malfunctioning altimeter. Minus eight; that is eight feet below sea level, is indeed the correct altitude for the runway at Schipol, as it, along with much of the Netherlands, is below sea level.

The autopilot, immediately reacted to this from its database, thinking the plane was now just above the runway and ready to touch down, even though it was still in fact at 1950 feet.

In this configuration, just before touchdown, the aircraft engines have to be throttled back to close to zero thrust, to slow the machine to near stall speed. This is what enables it to land on the runway, have the tires take the impact and friction, and stop in a reasonable distance. The autopilot did this, and the plane immediately started to lose thrust and altitude.

At this point, the second and third flaws in the Boeing altimeter's-autopilot system design kicked in. There was no warning alarm sounded when the two different readings suddenly came from the two altimeters. This, the experts say, violates one of the fundamental rules of aircraft design.

When systems are not functioning as they should be, an immediate warning alarm or flashing light, or both should activate. There are all kinds of such warnings on modern jets, each because of the principle that there has to be a backup, and that no one failure should lead to an accident.

Thus, the crew, occupied with other aspects of setting up their approach had no warning of the cross malfunction.

Next flaw: not only no warning of the disparity between the altimeters, but instead of immediately disconnecting the autopilot when the conflicting numbers appeared, the autopilot, getting only the left side information and with no program to tell it that this was erroneous, did not disconnect, but kept on functioning, shutting down the engines.

Had the system been programmed to provide for automatic disconnect, the engines would have stayed at the proper power settings. An insidious combination of events, and by the time the flight crew realized the dilemma and what had happened, the plane had faltered and lost too much altitude to spool up the engines to full power and to recover; all that could be done, as mentioned, was to try to keep the wings level and the plane from rolling.

Confirmation of the fact that this situation could not be blamed just on Turkish airlines or its flight crew, but was traceable to the inherent design and functioning of the system, ironically came just a few days later, some 10,000 miles away, when a Qantas Air 737, on approach to Sydney, experienced exactly the same sequence of malfunctions. The crew there, however, having previously learned of the Turkish incident, were able to immediately disconnect the autopilot, and maintain flight altitude and speed. There appear to be other reports now of similar problems.

Sterns & Walker, in association with another American law firm, and working in close collaboration with the leading Turkish law firm of Arikan and Arikan of Ankara,(Seckin Arikan) have been asked to visit Turkey to talk to potential clients and witnesses, as well as other Turkish lawyers.

We have had experience with this sequence of events involving Boeing machines before, and handled the case for a number of Turkish and German families who lost loved ones in that accident. Way back in the mid-eighties, an almost eerie similar incident occurred in a Boeing 757 charter flight climbing out of the Dominican Republic en route to Germany.

The altimeter-autopilot systems are the same as the 737, as the planes employ virtually similar cockpits. The left side altimeter malfunctioned, probably because of some blockage in the air tube that sensed the outside pressure, thus the altitude. The information was fed into the autopilot which reacted by shutting down the engines.

This flight was not so fortunate. It stalled, rolled over and corkscrewed down into the ocean. So far as we can see at this time, no changes of any kind have been made to the system by Boeing or its autopilot supplier.

We have so far made two visits to Turkey, conducting one, major press conference in Ankara to discuss these issues. We also met clients and potential clients and lawyers meeting in Istanbul. Mr. Sterns returned to America and is busy with follow up calls and communications.

At this point, it appears that our team has been retained by about 10 families and survivors, including members of the Turkish Air crew.

We continue talking with a number of others. No suits have yet been filed. We have cautioned that a premature filing, before all of the facts are in, and the Dutch finish their investigation as to the cause of the altimeter malfunction, may not be at all in the best interests of the victims and survivors.

Premature or precipitous lawsuit filings in the United States invariably trigger an aggressive response from aircraft manufacturers such as Boeing, who move the court immediately to dismiss the case, and force it to be brought in a much less favorable jurisdiction.

The less a court knows about the case, the history of the design and the problem, both of which are unique to the United States where the machine was designed and built, the more inclined it will be to dismiss the case summarily.

The facts and expert opinions needed to counteract these sorts of get-out-of-the-US courts attacks need to be assembled and marshaled. That is essentially is what our firm is doing now.

We hope that we will be able to assert meritorious claims arising out of this matter on behalf of our clients. Our website will be updated as developments in this case warrant.